FINRA Regulatory Notice 26-15 · Comment period open

FINRA says the rule protecting your price is “time-tested.” Here are the test results.

Rule 5310 is supposed to require your broker to get you the best price it reasonably can. In ten years, enforcing it produced ten paperwork cases and not one dollar returned to a single customer. Now FINRA is asking whether to relax it. Tell them no by September 25.

Comment period closes September 25, 2026
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What's happening

On July 24, 2026, FINRA, the self-regulatory organization that writes and enforces the rules your broker lives under, asked the public whether it should “modernize” its best execution guidance. That guidance is Rule 5310, and it is the rule that says your broker must use reasonable diligence to get you a price “as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions.”

The timing is not an accident. The SEC has proposed to rescind Rule 611, the Order Protection Rule, and its stated reason is that a broker's best execution duty will cover what's lost. That duty is Rule 5310. It lives in FINRA's rulebook. And FINRA is asking, right now, whether the one part of it that looks at the price you actually got should be relaxed.

FINRA calls its approach “time-tested.” We agree it has been tested. It failed.

Why it matters

Four things FINRA's own record says about the rule it wants to relax

We didn't have to build this case. FINRA's own disciplinary database, examination reports, and guidance build it.

1

Ten years. Ten cases. Zero dollars back to investors.

Every FINRA best execution action against a retail equity routing firm from 2016 through July 2026 fits on one page. Total fines: $13.15 million. Total restitution: nothing. The median case took seven years to resolve.

For scale: FINRA collected $89 million in fines in 2023 alone. In 2025 it brought 431 disciplinary actions and not one cited Rule 5310. FINRA disciplinary actions, 2016 to 2026
2

FINRA has found these violations every year since 2017

Nine consecutive FINRA examination reports describe the same failure in nearly identical words: firms not comparing the executions they obtained against what competing markets would have given their customers.

Firms are still “[n]ot comparing the quality of the execution obtained via firms' existing order-routing and execution arrangements against the quality of execution they could have obtained from competing markets.” FINRA 2026 Annual Regulatory Oversight Report
3

FINRA put the conduct in writing, then never charged it

In June 2021 FINRA reminded every member firm, in writing, that it may not negotiate routing arrangements in a way that cuts into customers' price improvement. That was a restatement of an obligation firms already had. Five years later, not one case has been brought on it.

Firms “may not negotiate the terms of order routing arrangements … in a manner that reduces the price improvement opportunities that otherwise would be available to those customer orders absent payment for order flow.” FINRA Regulatory Notice 21-23 (June 2021)
4

The one review that looks at your price is on the table

The Notice asks whether order-by-order review of internalized orders should “continue to be required,” whether a broker's own order router can serve as that review, and whether documented procedures should earn a safe harbor.

Order-by-order review is the only standard under which the customer's actual price is the object of the review. A router is the thing being reviewed. It cannot also be the review. WTI comment letter on RN 26-15, § V

The record

Every retail best execution case FINRA has brought in a decade

Each of these is a “process” case: the firm's review was not regular enough, rigorous enough, or documented enough. In none of them is the price the customer received the violation.

FINRA Rule 5310 actions against retail-relevant equity routing firms, 2016 to July 2026
Firm Settled Fine Restitution Time to resolve What FINRA found
E*TRADE Securities 2016 $900,000 $0 ~3 yrs Review lacked accurate data; an affiliate's routing changes were accepted without analysis.
Robinhood Financial 2019 $1,250,000 $0 ~2 yrs All four venues paid for order flow; price improvement elsewhere never considered; “hundreds of thousands of orders each month” never reviewed.
TradeStation Securities 2021 $850,000 $0 ~7 yrs Routed to the venues paying the most PFOF and the highest rebates, with no execution quality analysis.
Deutsche Bank Securities 2022 $2,000,000 $0 ~8 yrs Sent orders to its own ATS first despite fill rates there of 12% to 32% versus over 90% at exchanges.
Barclays Capital 2022 $2,000,000 $0 ~8.5 yrs Sent orders to its own ATS first despite inferior fill rates in every quarter from 2015 through Q1 2019.
Open to the Public Investing 2023 $500,000 $0 ~3 yrs Execution quality “reviews” consisted of reading the clearing firm's Rule 606 reports; no comparison to competing markets; payment for order flow not disclosed.
Interactive Brokers 2023 $3,500,000 $0 ~9 yrs Preferenced IOI venues without evaluating price improvement; month-end rebate-tier routing never assessed.
SpeedTrader (formerly Mint Global) 2024 No fine $0 ~7 yrs Review was a manual check of ten random executions every two weeks; roughly 100 million shares a year routed to net-trading broker-dealers interposed between the firm and the best market. No fine “due to the firm's financial status”; an independent consultant instead.
Folio Investments 2026 $1,300,000 $0 ~9 yrs Routed to two market centers that paid for order flow, then to an affiliate, and never compared them to competing markets.
tastytrade 2026 $850,000 $0 6.7 yrs 8.8 million orders routed exclusively to five market makers that paid for order flow, never compared to competing venues.
Ten cases, ten years $13,150,000 $0 7 yrs median Zero quantified harm. Zero wholesalers charged for retail routing. Zero cases on the terms of a payment-for-order-flow arrangement.

These are the cases about where a firm chose to send your order, drawn from all 127 of FINRA's monthly disciplinary reports from January 2016 through July 2026. Four of the ten carry 2014 matter numbers: FINRA opened a best execution sweep in 2014 and closed its last case from it in December 2023. Four carry 2017 numbers, from a sweep announced in January 2018 to examine payment for order flow specifically; it produced its first case in December 2019 and its last in July 2026. Eight and a half years of examining zero-commission brokers produced four settlements, three fines totaling $3.4 million, one firm too financially weak to fine, and no restitution. During those same years, Robinhood alone collected several billion dollars in payment for order flow and related revenue.

By the numbers

What one broker's arrangement cost its customers

How the value in your order gets split

Share of the value in a retail order that reached the customer as price improvement, rather than the broker as payment. Robinhood “explicitly offered to accept less price improvement for its customers … in exchange for receiving a higher rate of payment for order flow for itself.” SEC order, Dec. 17, 2020.

What each regulator did about it
$34.1M
in price improvement the SEC found Robinhood's customers lost, Oct. 2016 to June 2019
vs
$1.25M
FINRA's fine for the same conduct, and $0 restitution

FINRA's fine came to roughly 3.7% of the harm the SEC would go on to measure, and less than 2% of Robinhood's annual payment for order flow revenue at the time. Six months later FINRA published Regulatory Notice 21-23 describing that conduct as a violation. It has never charged anyone with it.

Take action

Tell FINRA: enforce Rule 5310

FINRA has never received a wave of comment letters from individual investors. That is why yours will stand out. We've written a starting point. Edit it, then send it in two taps.

  1. Make it yours

    Add a sentence about your own experience as an investor. FINRA hears from member firms constantly and from individual investors almost never, so a personal note is worth more here than anywhere.

  2. Pick one route

    Either open a pre-filled email, already addressed to FINRA's Office of the Corporate Secretary with the notice number in the subject, or copy your message into FINRA's official comment form. Both land in the same public file.

  3. Send it once

    FINRA asks that you use only one method, so pick whichever is easier and don't do both. Your comment is then on the record. To go further, see writing your own letter below, or copy the SEC on it.

Your comment goes to FINRA
To  pubcom@finra.org
Subject  Regulatory Notice 26-15

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Comments are posted publicly. FINRA publishes comments on its website, including personal details you include. Share only what you're comfortable making public. Your name is optional.

Consider copying the SEC. Because the SEC has proposed to rescind Rule 611 on the strength of FINRA's best execution regime, this record belongs in that docket too. Add rule-comments@sec.gov as a cc and put File No. S7-2026-20 in the subject line, or submit separately on the SEC's comment page.

You can read the full notice on FINRA's website, comment directly on FINRA's comment form, or mail a letter to Jennifer Piorko Mitchell, Office of the Corporate Secretary, FINRA, 1700 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006. Use only one of the three.

Read our full comment letter

Every figure on this page comes from We the Investors' 40-page letter to FINRA, copied to the SEC. It documents the enforcement record case by case, sets out all twelve recommendations in full, and includes a proposed best execution examination module FINRA could adopt as written.

Go deeper

Writing your own letter

A letter in your own words counts for far more than a form letter. This section is everything you need to write one: how the rule actually works, what FINRA is really asking, what to ask for, and the facts and sources you can cite. You do not need to use all of it. Pick the one or two points you care about most.

First, how Rule 5310 actually works

The duty. Rule 5310(a)(1) requires a broker to “use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for the subject security and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to the customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions.” That is a standard about the price you actually get, and it is enforceable: FINRA holds the order-level data to test any firm's routing against it. The rule has been substantively unchanged since 2012.

The escape hatch. Supplementary Material .09 says a firm that doesn't review orders one at a time may instead run a “regular and rigorous review” of execution quality, at least quarterly, on a security-by-security, type-of-order basis. In practice that means a committee looks at averages every three months instead of anyone looking at your trade.

Where the conflict sits. Payment for order flow appears in the rule text only as one of eight factors a review should “consider.” The actual prohibition, that a firm may not negotiate routing terms that cut into customers' price improvement, exists only in guidance (Regulatory Notice 21-23), not in the rule.

So FINRA charges the paperwork, not the price. Nothing in the rule stops FINRA from charging a broker whose routing demonstrably costs its customers price improvement. It has simply never done it. What it enforces instead is the review requirement, so a firm that convenes a quarterly committee, produces minutes saying it “considered” the eight factors, and then routes every order to the wholesalers that pay it has, on this record, nothing to fear. Your price is never the violation. The paperwork is. That is why all ten cases are paperwork cases, why none measures harm, and why none orders a dollar of restitution.

What FINRA is asking, and what you can say

The Notice asks dozens of questions. These are the ones that would move the rule in the wrong direction, plus two that could move it in the right direction. Answering even a single question by number makes your letter far more useful to FINRA staff.

Topic 3, Question 1 Should order-by-order review “continue to be required” for internalized order flow?

Why it mattersOrder-by-order review is the only standard under which your actual price is the thing being reviewed. Everything else is a quarterly look at averages. Remove it and the rule stops touching the outcome altogether.

What you can sayOrder-by-order review must stay, and should be extended to all retail orders rather than relaxed. FINRA itself said in 2021 that technology has made it practicable.

Topic 3, Question 3 Should a “smarter order router” with “built-in best execution logic” count as an order-by-order review?

Why it mattersThe router is the thing being reviewed. A firm whose own routing software certifies its routing decisions is grading its own exam.

What you can sayA router cannot also be the review. Reject any interpretation that lets routing software substitute for an independent look at the price the customer received.

Topic 1, Question 9 Should FINRA create safe harbors for “executions pursuant to documented regular and rigorous methodologies”?

Why it mattersEvery one of the ten enforcement actions in a decade was a paperwork case. A safe harbor for documentation would convert the loophole into a defense: produce the minutes, keep the payments.

What you can sayNo safe harbor for documentation. If anything, FINRA should publish what a “regular and rigorous” review must actually contain, and enforce against the price rather than the paperwork.

Topic 1, Question 6 Should FINRA set standards for “providing price improvement to different customer orders”?

Why it mattersYes, but the standard has to be objective. “97% of orders received price improvement” only means the fill was inside the spread by at least a hundredth of a cent. One mil on a two-cent spread is not best execution; it is a receipt.

What you can saySet a real floor: where a firm takes payment for order flow or internalizes, require the midpoint or better when the spread is one tick, and at least a full tick when it is wider.

Topic 1, Question 10 How should FINRA approach oversight “in the absence of a trade-through rule”?

Why it mattersThe SEC has proposed to rescind Rule 611 on the theory that FINRA's best execution duty catches whatever falls through. FINRA responds by calling its framework “time-tested” and asking whether to relax it. Each regulator is pointing at the other.

What you can sayFINRA should tell the SEC plainly whether it is prepared to be the only protection on every retail order, and what it will do differently from the last ten years. If the answer is “nothing,” Rule 611 must not be rescinded.

Topic 8 Is additional guidance needed for listed options?

Why it mattersEverything here is worse in options. Roughly 70% of all retail payment for order flow comes from options, and there is no Rule 605 for options, so even the aggregate execution quality data that exist for stocks do not exist at all.

What you can sayYes. Every fix FINRA adopts for equities should apply expressly to listed options, and options need execution quality disclosure of their own.

What to ask FINRA to do

These are the twelve changes We the Investors asked for. Adopt any of them in your own words, or make your own ask.

  1. Order-by-order review for every retail order

    Replace the quarterly aggregate standard for retail flow. The review must consider all venues, including ones the firm has no relationship with, and must be quantitative. Institutional orders can keep today's flexibility.

  2. An objective price improvement floor

    Where a firm takes payment for order flow or internalizes, presume the execution fails best execution unless it gets the midpoint or better on a one-tick spread, and at least a full tick on a wider one. Canada has done this since 2012.

  3. Execution quality reported per routing broker

    Wholesalers should have to publish execution quality for each broker whose orders they handle. Broker-level discrimination is invisible in today's aggregate data, and stays that way until the data are broken out.

  4. Review the routing inputs, not just the outputs

    A firm can engineer a bad result at a venue it wants to avoid. Reviews must document the routing parameters used at each venue, or they are just grading a test the firm wrote.

  5. No relying on the reviews of the firm that pays you

    FINRA should state that a routing firm may never rely on the receiving firm's review where that firm pays for the orders or executes them as principal. You cannot outsource a duty of loyalty to the other side of the conflict.

  6. No blanket “not held” designations for retail orders

    FINRA says it has observed firms burying “not held” language in new account agreements. It should say that this violates Rule 5310, and then charge it.

  7. Examiner access to the routing audit trail

    Examiners should be able to inspect the order routing audit trail directly and periodically, not only on request. And FINRA should publish, annually, its Rule 5310 exam, referral, enforcement and restitution counts.

  8. A standardized examination module

    FINRA has never published what a “regular and rigorous” review must contain, which is why every review is different and every case is a bespoke argument about adequacy.

  9. Bring one case on the theory FINRA announced in 2021

    FINRA has the SEC's Robinhood order, a wholesaler CEO's own on-camera account, nine years of its own exam findings, and the order-level data nobody else has. The theory has been on the books since June 2021. Use it.

  10. Benchmark every firm against its peers, and act on the outliers

    Collect the same handful of execution quality numbers from every firm quarterly, then compare brokers at the same wholesaler, in the same stock, at the same moment. The Consolidated Audit Trail identifies the routing broker, so FINRA can do on every order what one academic study did with 85,000. Examine the firms at the bottom on execution and the top on payment received; refer the repeat offenders.

  11. Take the conflicted firms out of the room

    Governors and committee members whose firms pay, receive, or internalize retail order flow should recuse from best execution matters, and each recusal should be published. Nobody should hold a seat while employed by a firm that has been the subject of an enforcement action in the past decade.

  12. Make a named person accountable

    Every firm should name a registered principal personally responsible for best execution oversight, certifying annually and after any material routing change. Ten years of process cases produced ten fines paid by firms and no consequence for any individual.

A structure that works

  1. Say who you are. “I am an individual investor” is enough. If you trade actively, or manage a retirement account, or got into markets after 2021, say so. It costs a sentence and it makes you a person.
  2. Say what you want in one sentence, up front. For example: “FINRA should keep and expand order-by-order review of retail orders, not relax it.”
  3. Give one or two reasons, with a fact. Pick from the facts below. Two well-sourced points land harder than ten assertions.
  4. Answer a numbered question if you can. Cite it as “Topic 3, Question 1”; that is how staff sort comments.
  5. Say what it means for you. This is the part no lobbyist can write. What does it mean to you that nobody checks the price you got?
  6. Close with the ask again, and thank them. Sign it or don't; your name is optional.

Length is not the point. A clear page beats a vague ten. FINRA's comment files are almost entirely industry submissions, so a few honest paragraphs from an individual investor stand out. Don't let anything stop you.

Ammunition

Facts you can cite, with sources

Everything here is on the public record. Quote any of it; the source line is what makes it credible.

The enforcement record

  • Ten FINRA best execution cases about retail order routing from 2016 through July 2026: $13.15 million in fines, $0 in restitution, median 7 years to resolve. All 127 FINRA monthly disciplinary reports, Jan. 2016 to July 2026
  • FINRA collected $89M in fines in 2023, $59M in 2024, $75M in 2025. The entire decade of retail best execution fines is about one seventh of what FINRA collected in 2023 alone. Eversheds Sutherland annual FINRA sanctions survey
  • In 2025 FINRA brought 431 disciplinary actions, the fewest in at least a decade, and not one cited Rule 5310. FINRA disciplinary actions, 2025
  • Best execution has appeared in the top five FINRA fine categories exactly once in five years: fifth place, in 2022. Eversheds Sutherland survey
  • The SEC fined Citadel Securities $22.6 million for running algorithms that executed millions of retail orders at prices it could see were not the best available. It was charged as a disclosure violation. Nobody was ever charged with failing to get those customers the best price. SEC order, 2017
  • The one affiliate-internalization case FINRA can claim in a decade, E*TRADE, did not come from FINRA's surveillance. It began when Ken Griffin, then an E*TRADE director, pressed the firm on whether orders routed to its in-house market maker were getting best execution. FINRA AWC, June 2016
  • FINRA does charge Rule 5310 elsewhere: roughly two dozen cases over the same decade about stale bond prices, delayed market orders, and mishandled OTC orders, typically fined between $12,500 and $125,000. None concerned the decision to route retail orders to a venue that pays the broker. FINRA monthly disciplinary reports, 2016 to 2026

What FINRA knew

  • Nine consecutive FINRA exam reports from 2017 to 2026 report firms “failing to compare the quality of the executions firms obtained … against the quality of the executions they could have obtained from competing markets.” FINRA Exam Findings & Annual Oversight Reports
  • January 2018: FINRA announced it was “expanding our equity best execution surveillance program to assess the degree to which firms provide price improvement.” That surveillance pattern has never produced a public case. FINRA 2018 Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter
  • February 2020: FINRA sent zero-commission brokers a targeted exam letter demanding their PFOF contracts, dollar amounts, any “expected or guaranteed execution quality,” and best execution committee minutes. FINRA targeted examination letter
  • 2018: the SEC's Investor Advocate warned Congress that enforcement “tend[s] to focus on black-and-white allegations … rather than more gray areas such as a broker's obligation to achieve the ‘best execution’ of customer orders.” SEC Office of the Investor Advocate, 2018 Report to Congress

The conflict, described by the people in it

  • Virtu's CEO, asked on CNBC whether a Fidelity customer gets a better price than a Robinhood customer: “Overall, through the course of a month, we will provide more price improvement for Fidelity than we do to Robinhood.” CNBC Squawk Box, March 11, 2021
  • Every defense of payment for order flow made today was made to the SEC in 1989, in these words: brokers route to me because “they get a totally automated execution”; yes, “I am providing different quotes to different parties”; the payments are fine because they are “right out in the open” and “the NASD can audit that.” The speaker was Bernie Madoff. The regulator never did audit it. SEC roundtable on payment for order flow, July 1989
  • Citadel, to the SEC in 2004: “Because payment for order flow creates fundamental conflicts of interest that cannot be cured by disclosure, the Commission should ban payment for order flow altogether.” Citadel comment letter, April 13, 2004
  • Senator Carl Levin to TD Ameritrade in 2014, on routing orders to whoever paid most: “virtually always led you to route orders to the markets that paid you the most.” The answer: “virtually, yes.” Senate PSI hearing, June 17, 2014
  • A study in the Journal of Finance placed ~85,000 simultaneous identical orders across five brokers. Share of the spread returned as price improvement: 47% at TD Ameritrade, 27% at Robinhood, 19% at Interactive Brokers. At the identical wholesaler in the identical second, “every single of the five venues provides better execution for TD Ameritrade.” Schwarz, Barber, Huang, Jorion & Odean

Why “97% got price improvement” means little

  • The SEC found 18.64% of price-improved shares in wholesaler principal trades got less than a tenth of a cent, and that 51% of internalized retail marketable shares executed worse than the NBBO midpoint. SEC Order Competition Rule proposal
  • 75% of those shares “could have hypothetically executed at a better price” against non-displayed liquidity resting at the midpoint. SEC Order Competition Rule proposal
  • WTI's own tape analysis: the single most common amount of “price improvement” on off-exchange sub-penny trades in large caps is exactly one mil, one hundredth of a cent, regardless of how wide the spread was. WTI analysis of consolidated tape data
  • Rule 605 reports don't break out execution quality by the broker that sent the order, so a wholesaler can post excellent averages while treating brokers differently. Schwarz et al.

There is no competitive check

  • In 2025, Citadel Securities alone handled 36% of non-ATS volume in NMS Tier 1 securities among the seven retail wholesalers; Citadel and Virtu together, 61%. WTI analysis of FINRA OTC Transparency data
  • That's an HHI of 2,438, well past the 1,800 at which the DOJ and FTC call a market “highly concentrated,” and it is still climbing. 2023 DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines
  • Individual investors can't sue over this either: the Eighth Circuit reversed class certification because per-share harm of a fraction of a cent requires “individualized inquiry.” Eighth Circuit, TD Ameritrade routing litigation
  • And industry custom is no defense: “Even a universal industry practice may still be fraudulent.” Newton v. Merrill Lynch (3d Cir., en banc)

Who FINRA answers to

  • Of FINRA's $1.96 billion in 2025 revenue, $991 million was regulatory fees paid by the firms it regulates, and that is after the Board voted to rebate $150 million back to them. The rebate alone is eleven times what FINRA collected in retail order routing fines in the preceding decade. FINRA 2025 Annual Financial Report
  • Ten of FINRA's twenty-two governors hold industry seats. Since January 2026 one has been Robinhood's Chief Legal, Compliance and Corporate Affairs Officer, appointed ten months after Robinhood's $26 million FINRA settlement. FINRA Board of Governors
  • From September 2017 the Floor Member Governor's seat was held by Citadel Securities' Head of Execution Services, through the years FINRA was running its price improvement surveillance and its zero-commission sweep. FINRA Board of Governors
  • A senior FINRA official has likened bringing a best execution case, absent a misrepresentation, to “nailing jell-o to a wall.” The jell-o is FINRA's own recipe: a regulator that enforces an outcome standard as a paperwork standard can only ever prove paperwork failures. WTI comment letter on RN 26-15, § V

The rest of the world already decided

  • The UK's FCA: payment for order flow is “incompatible with our rules on conflicts of interest and inducements,” and “the most straightforward method of complying … would be to prevent the conflict from arising in the first place.” FCA
  • The EU banned it under MiFIR Article 39a; the last transitional exemption expired June 30, 2026. Singapore banned it in April 2023. Canada effectively prohibits it. MiFIR; MAS; UMIR
  • Meanwhile FINRA Rule 3220 caps what one firm may give an employee of another, on the theory that a gift above the cap might sway that person's judgment. The cap went from $100 to $300 in March 2026 to keep up with inflation. FINRA knows a conflict of interest when the amount is $100. It cannot seem to find one when the amount is $100 million. FINRA Rule 3220 / FINRA Forward

If Rule 611 goes, this is all that's left

  • When certain 40-share quotes became protected on November 3, 2025, the off-exchange trade-through rate on them fell from 12.6% to 0.2%. Rescinding Rule 611 runs that in reverse, market-wide. SEC round-lot analysis
  • The SEC concedes rescission means wholesalers “may begin to trade through displayed round-lot quotes,” “result[ing] in worse prices,” and would “transfer value from the retail investors to the wholesalers, who would earn higher profits.” SEC Reg NMS proposing release
  • The 2005 release adopting Rule 611 explained why it was needed: “many of the investors that ultimately received the inferior price … may not be aware that their orders did not, in fact, obtain the best price.” Rule 611 was built so protection wouldn't depend on you noticing. SEC Reg NMS adopting release, 2005

Options are worse

  • The top five retail brokers disclosed $587 million in options payment for order flow against $436 million in equities, in the first quarter of 2021 alone. Rule 606 disclosures
  • Roughly 70% of all retail payment for order flow comes from options; the same dollar invested generates about ten times as much PFOF in options as in equities. SEC Regulation Best Execution release
  • There is no Rule 605 for options, so the aggregate execution quality data that at least exist for stocks do not exist at all. We have located no FINRA enforcement action on options best execution for retail flow. WTI comment letter, § VIII

Questions

Before you comment

What is FINRA, and why am I writing to it instead of the SEC?

FINRA is the self-regulatory organization that writes and enforces the rules your broker operates under, overseen by the SEC. Best execution, the duty to get you the best price reasonably available, lives in FINRA's rulebook as Rule 5310, not in any SEC rule. FINRA is the only regulator with that rule, the order-level data, and the authority to act on it. That's why this letter goes to FINRA.

Does commenting on a FINRA notice actually matter?

Yes, and here more than usual. FINRA's comment files are almost entirely industry submissions: firms, trade associations, and their counsel. Individual investors rarely write in at all. A visible file of investor letters would be something new in this process, and it becomes part of the public record the SEC sees when it decides whether to rescind Rule 611 on the strength of FINRA's best execution regime.

Do I need to be a markets expert?

No. A few honest sentences about why the price you get on your trades matters to you carry more weight than a polished form letter. Use the draft above as a starting point, or pick a single point from the sections above and write about that one thing.

Will my comment be public?

Yes. FINRA posts comments on its website, including any personal details you include. Share only what you're comfortable making public. Your name is optional.

What's the difference between this and the Rule 611 campaign?

They're two halves of the same fight. The SEC proposed to rescind Rule 611, the rule that mechanically guarantees you the best displayed price, on the theory that a broker's best execution duty covers what's lost. This campaign is about that duty: whether FINRA is willing and able to enforce it. If Rule 5310 is going to be the only protection left, its enforcement record has to be part of the SEC's record too. So we suggest copying the SEC on your letter.

How long does this take?

About two minutes with the draft above. Fifteen or twenty if you want to write your own using the guide, and that version is worth more.

When's the deadline?

Comments are due September 25, 2026. Earlier is better; don't wait for the last day.

FINRA has never heard from us. Let's change that.

Comment today, then stay in the loop and we'll alert you the moment the next fight for fair markets opens.

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